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Abstract
In a market environment with random detection of product quality,
a ﬁrm can employ umbrella branding as a strategy to convince con-
sumers of the high quality of its products. Alternatively, a ﬁrm can
rely on external certiﬁcation of the quality of one or both of its prod-
ucts. We characterize equilibria in which umbrella branding fully or
partially substitutes for external certiﬁcation. We also show that the
potential to signal quality is improved if consumers condition their be-
liefs on the source of information, namely whether information comes
from external certiﬁcation or from random detection.
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In this paper, we present an information-based theory of umbrella branding as
a full or partial substitute to socially costly, external (or, equivalently, third-
party) certiﬁcation. We consider an adverse selection environment in which a
ﬁrm holds private information about the product quality of its two products
and in which the asymmetric information problem is severe from society’s
point of view, in the sense that it is socially desirable to have high-quality
products on the market, whereas it is socially undesirable to have low-quality
products on the market. Certiﬁcation of product quality is a viable option
for a ﬁrm to reveal high product quality, but it is costly both from a private
and a social point of view. However, a ﬁrm with broad abilities, i.e., which
is able to produce two diﬀerent high-quality products, may fully or partially
avoid costly external certiﬁcation by the use of umbrella branding. A ﬁrm
with narrow abilities, i.e., which is able to produce only one high-quality
product, must resort to external certiﬁcation. We are able to capture these
results in a simple one-period model, assuming that prior to purchase there is
a positive probability that product quality will be revealed to all consumers
(e.g., due to random inspections by a public authority).
For illustration, consider the market for bottled water in Europe. Taking
a look at major European countries, we observe that many products are
certiﬁed by an external laboratory. For instance, in Germany, the company
Fresenius acts as an external certiﬁer for most German producers. Fresenius
regularly checks the water quality, and its analysis of water ingredients (in
particular, minerals) is printed on the bottle. However, recently international
companies such as Coca-Cola and Nestl´ e have entered the markets with their
products Bonaqa and Aquarel, respectively. Bonaqa is then sold, for example,
in vending machines together with other Coca-Cola products; Aquarel is
sold explicitly under the Nestl´ e brand. While Bonaqa provides minimum
information on ingredients (without reference), Nestl´ ed o e sn o tp r o v i d ea n y
information. On its UK web site, it merely says: “The stringent controls set
out by Nestl´ e guarantee the high quality of Nestl´ e Aquarel.”1 Both companies
1See http://www.nestle-aquarel.com/uk/a-1 eau source naturelle.htm,c h e c k e d
June 25, 2007. Similar statements are found for other countries in their local languages.
According to EU deﬁnitions, Bonaqa is a table water and Aquarel a spring water,
whereas other producers typically sell mineral waters. Although there are clear criteria to
distinguish between these kinds of water, average consumers appear to consider that they
belong to the same product category. By 2006, Bonaqa has established itself as a leading
1refrain from the use of an external certiﬁer and implicitly or explicitly sell
the product under an umbrella brand. Note that consumers may also obtain
information about product quality through (random) detection, e.g., via
tests published by the nonproﬁt organization Stiftung Warentest: in 2002, it
published a quality index for 29 mineral waters that were sold in Germany.
Since there are more than 200 producers of mineral waters in Germany and
tests are not repeated regularly, this gives rise to a positive probability that
product quality is detected before purchase.2
Umbrella branding is a frequently-used business practice that has received
wide attention in the academic and nonacademic business literature.3 The
general feature in an asymmetric information environment is that umbrella
branding allows consumers to correlate beliefs. The use of umbrella branding
and, when available, information regarding one product are used to update
beliefs about the quality of other existing or future products for which this
information is lacking. The existing economics literature has looked at a
variety of moral hazard (Choi, 1998; Andersson, 2002; Hakenes and Peitz,
2008; Cabral, 2007) and adverse selection environments (Wernerfelt, 1988;
Cabral, 2000; Mikl´ os-Thal, 2007).4 In all these papers umbrella branding is
the only signalling strategy available to the ﬁrm. Our paper is complemen-
tary to these papers in that we consider a market in which an alternative
“signalling” strategy, namely costly external certiﬁcation, is readily available
to the ﬁrm and can reveal product quality to consumers. With external cer-
tiﬁcation, the trivial reason that signalling works is because the quality of a
product is fully revealed to consumers by a certifying expert, whose verdict
brand in the market for table and mineral waters in Germany (as, e.g., documented in
Stern trend proﬁle 04/06, published by the German magazine Stern).
2As another illustration, we can take the organic food industry in Germany, where some
producers rely on external certiﬁcation through, e.g., Demeter or Bioland, while others
use their umbrella brand as an attempt to convince consumers of their quality. Both
strategies can be understood as an attempt to convince consumers that quality is above
the standards that are required by the European Union. In addition, there are random
checks in the form of tests published by magazines such as ¨ Okotest.
3A number of empirical papers (with experimental as well as ﬁeld data) are broadly
consistent with the view that umbrella branding allows a ﬁrm to solve an asymmetric
information problem. For empirical evidence (with ﬁeld data) see e.g. Erdem (1998) and
Balachander and Ghose (2003). For experimental evidence see e.g. Aaker and Keller
(1990).
4Some recent work looks at additional issues, e.g. Cai and Obara (2006) at horizontal
integration and Dana and Spier (2006) at bundling.
2is assumed to be beyond doubt. But when does umbrella branding provide
“certiﬁcation” in such an environment, and can it be a substitute for external
certiﬁcation? Clearly, direct costs involved in the use of umbrella branding
must be lower than those for external certiﬁcation. But is this suﬃcient? Or,
despite its lower costs, does umbrella branding lose its signalling potential
in an environment in which external certiﬁcation is available?5 This paper
makes three points.
First, for a ﬁrm that produces two high-quality goods, umbrella branding
can be the proﬁt-maximizing strategy. One type of equilibrium consists of a
ﬁrm with two high-quality products using umbrella branding to fully substi-
tute for external certiﬁcation. We show that the umbrella branding strategy
is not proﬁtable for other ﬁrms. The reason is that, since there is a positive
detection probability, umbrella branding allows consumers to use negative
information they receive on one product when forming their posterior belief
about the quality of the other product.6 Therefore, a ﬁrm with one high-
and one low-quality product obtains higher proﬁts if it does not use umbrella
branding but externally certiﬁes its high-quality product.
Second, under certain parameter constellations, there are equilibria with
partial certiﬁcation. Here, the certiﬁed product serves as an anchor for the
non-certiﬁed product under the umbrella brand. Imitation by a ﬁrm that
also has a low-quality product is not proﬁtable if the detection probability
is suﬃciently high. In this environment, there are no reputation feed-back
eﬀects; this contrasts with an equilibrium in which umbrella branding works
as a signal absent certiﬁcation. Still, there is a role for umbrella branding,
since external certiﬁcation costs can at least partly be avoided, presuming
that the use of umbrella branding is costly.
Third, the signalling potential of umbrella branding is improved if con-
sumers condition their beliefs on the source of information they receive.
There are two sources of information: the deliberate decision by the ﬁrm
to certify its product, which reveals quality with probability 1, and (if cer-
5By comparing two diﬀerent marketing strategies, namely external certiﬁcation and
umbrella branding, our paper contributes to the literature on the design of marketing
practice and its allocative consequences (see Wernerfelt, 1994). For an informal discussion
in the context of the food industry, see Sporleder and Goldsmith (2001).
6To support umbrella branding as a signal, the use of umbrella branding has to be costly
in our base model (see Section 4). However, as is shown in Section 5, under additional
conditioning of consumer beliefs umbrella branding may be a signal of product quality,
even if its use is associated with lower costs than selling products under separate brands.
3tiﬁcation is not used) the random detection of quality, which reveals quality
with positive probability strictly less than 1. But what is the motivation for
a ﬁrm to certify one of its products under umbrella branding if consumers
believe that umbrella branding on its own is regarded as a quality signal?
It must mean that the ﬁrm wants to prevent the product that is detected
to be of low quality from having a negative impact on the perception of the
other product’s quality. This means consumers should believe that a ﬁrm
that certiﬁes one product under umbrella branding must have something to
hide, namely that the other product is of low quality. Under such beliefs,
the signalling potential of umbrella branding (as a full substitute for external
certiﬁcation) is improved. Here, signalling is even compatible with umbrella
branding being costless or bringing some ﬁxed beneﬁt.
We would also like to mention another feature of our model framework
that distinguishes it from the rest of the literature (in addition to the possi-
bility of external certiﬁcation). All previous work on umbrella branding as a
signal of product quality considers a dynamic setting. Either a multi-period
game is analyzed, in which the ﬁrm is committed to constant quality for
a product in all periods, or an inﬁnite-horizon model is considered in which
the signalling result relies on the use of non-Markovian supergame strategies.
By introducing initial detection probabilities, we essentially collapse a two-
period model into a single period. This way, we can provide a meaningful
analysis within a one-period model and it is immaterial whether consumers
observe quality after consumption; our analysis thus also applies to credence
goods whose quality, however, can be observed by third parties (and the ﬁrm
itself).
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sec-
tion 3 provides preliminary results on the role of external certiﬁcation, when
umbrella branding is not available, and of umbrella branding, when exter-
nal certiﬁcation is not available. Section 4 analyzes umbrella branding when
consumers do not distinguish where their information about product qual-
ity comes from. Section 5 extends the analysis to the case where consumer
beliefs can be conditioned on the source of information. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We provide a particularly simple model that can address issues of umbrella
branding. Consider a model with two products of potentially diﬀerent quali-
4ties. Qualities are described by numbers θH and θL, measuring the willingness
to pay of all consumers. By deﬁnition, consumers are willing to pay more for
high than for low quality, θH >θ L. Qualities, viewed as random variables,
are assumed to be independent across products: Each product is of high
quality with probability p. The realized product quality is observed by the
ﬁrm but not always by consumers. To be precise, after the ﬁrm has taken
its strategic decisions, the product is tested with probability δ by a third
party (e.g., a nonproﬁt organization or a private company such as a maga-
zine that reports quality tests), in which case quality realization is truthfully
communicated to consumers.7 Before these tests are performed, the ﬁrm has
to take several decisions. It decides which products to oﬀer in the market.
It may not want to oﬀer a low-quality product on the market because the
revenues from selling low quality may not recover the sunk cost f. In addi-
tion, the ﬁrm can go to an external certiﬁer who truthfully reveals quality to
consumers. We do not explicitly model the behavior of the external certiﬁer,
but simply assume that a high-quality ﬁrm that pays c for a product reveals
the quality of this product to consumers.8
The cost c can alternatively be interpreted as the cost of a high-quality
ﬁrm to provide a warranty—note that even a perfectly functioning product
may trigger these costs if there is a moral hazard problem on the consumer
side and the ﬁrm cannot prove that the malfunctioning of a product is due
to inappropriate use. The warranty works as a quality signal. If providing a
warranty is prohibitively costly for a low-quality product, the formal analysis
is the same (see also our conclusion).
Certiﬁcation of low quality is never an attractive option. Alternatively,
or on top of certiﬁcation, the ﬁrm can sell its products under an umbrella
7In several countries the results of product tests are published for a variety of products
(e.g., in the U.S., Consumer Reports is published by the nonproﬁt organization Consumers
Union). This corresponds to random detection by consumers because only a number of
product categories (and within each category not necessarily all products) are covered by
these tests. Note that in our model any detection provides full information about the
product. In spite of this assumption, we are able to show that there is a role for umbrella
branding. This is related to the issue of observability of quality in multi-period settings,
where Wernerfelt (1988) assumes that a failure perfectly reveals that the product is of
low quality, in contrast to Mikl´ os-Thal (2007), where it is only an imperfect signal. To
support umbrella branding as a quality signal, the former requires that umbrella branding
is costly (as do we), whereas the latter does not.
8For an explicit model of external certiﬁcation see Biglaiser (1993).
5brand at a cost k.9 Umbrella branding can here be understood as an attempt
to certify one or both products without the help of an external certiﬁer. We
assume that k<2c. Otherwise, a ﬁrm with high-quality products weakly
prefers to certify the quality for both, rather than to put them under the
costly umbrella. We present a one-period model so that issues of commitment
are successfully eliminated from the analysis.
The sequence of moves can be described as follows:
Stage 1: Nature chooses the quality of both products as independent
draws from a pool in which high quality occurs with probability p.T h e
product qualities are observed by the ﬁrm but not by consumers.
Stage 2: The ﬁrm decides which products to oﬀer on the market and
pays the associated ﬁxed cost per product f. It also decides whether to use
umbrella branding at a cost k and which (high-quality) product, if any, to
certify at a cost c.
Stage 3: Consumers observe whether products are sold under an umbrella
brand. They also observe the true quality of a product with probability 1 if it
is certiﬁed, and with detection probability δ otherwise (where the underlying
random variables are independent across products). Consumers update their
beliefs and bid for the two products.
We analyze perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBE) of this game. In order to
avoid the issue of price signalling, we introduce bidding by consumers and
assume that there is excess demand for the product. In particular, we assume
that there is mass 1 for each product that is put on the market and that there
is a mass of consumers strictly greater than one. Thus consumers simply bid
their expected surplus. Alternatively, if the ﬁrm sets prices for each product
at stage 2, our analysis characterizes equilibria in which the ﬁrm extracts the
full expected surplus from consumers.10
In this model we want to highlight four assumptions, which contain pa-
rameter restrictions and deﬁne the market environment of interest. First, we
assume that externally certiﬁed high quality is viable in the market.
Assumption 1 θH − c − f>0.
9Wernerfelt (1988) argues that k is often positive because a brand’s image becomes
diluted as diﬀerent products are sold under the same brand. See however Section 4 in
which k can be of any sign.
10Full surplus extraction has also been assumed by Tadelis (1999) in a diﬀerent context
and Cabral (2000), Hakenes and Peitz (2008), and Mikl´ os-Thal (2007) in the context of
umbrella branding.
6Thus, in the absence of umbrella branding (i.e., if products are sold sep-
arately under diﬀerent brands), a high-quality ﬁrm can certify its products
and obtain strictly positive proﬁts (see Section 3.1). Assumption 2 states
that certiﬁcation dominates non-certiﬁcation if, in the absence of certiﬁca-
tion, products are believed to be of low quality (provided there is no other
evidence), i.e., δθ H +( 1− δ)θL − f<θ H − c − f.
Assumption 2 (1 − δ)(θH − θL) >c .
In a separating equilibrium, a single-product ﬁrm then always (externally)
certiﬁes high quality. The motivation for our ﬁrst two assumptions is that we
are interested in market environments in which we would observe external
certiﬁcation in the absence of the availability of umbrella branding; we want
to understand the conditions under which umbrella branding can play the role
of a quality signal. Third, we assume that low-quality provision is socially
undesirable.
Assumption 3 θL − f<0.
Here, θL −f are also the proﬁts that accrue to a low-quality product un-
der full information. Hence, in a separating equilibrium, a low-quality ﬁrm
prefers not to be active. The motivation for our third assumption is that
we want to analyze an environment in which separation entails the desirable
welfare property that low-quality products do not enter the market. How-
ever, a low-quality ﬁrm that is thought to produce high quality still makes
positive proﬁts. Otherwise, there would not exist an asymmetric information
problem, and thus no rationale for certiﬁcation, because a low-quality ﬁrm
would never enter the market in the ﬁrst place. This is stated as our fourth
assumption.
Assumption 4 δθ L +( 1− δ)θH − f>0.
Throughout the analysis all four assumptions are supposed to be satis-
ﬁed. Assumptions 1 and 2 are of course only relevant in markets in which
certiﬁcation is available and thus do not apply to Section 3.2.
In the presence of asymmetric information, we introduce consumer be-
liefs. For each product, the consumers may know that the product is of high
or low quality or they may not know the quality. Thus we have the informa-
tion partition {{θH},{θL},{θH,θ L}}. Information with respect to product
7i, denoted by Ii, is then described by an element from this set. In addition,
consumers observe whether umbrella branding is used. If a product is sold
under an umbrella brand we write u = 1, otherwise we write u = 0. Posterior
beliefs about product i are then b(θi|u,Ii,I j) ∈ [0, 1], the perceived proba-
bility that this product is of high quality where i,j =1 ,2, i  = j, u ∈{ 0,1},
Ij ∈{ { θH},{θL},{θH,θ L}}. Clearly, if a product’s high quality has been
certiﬁed (or its quality detected), consumers are convinced that this product
has high quality, i.e. b(θi|u,Ii = {θH},I j) = 1. Also, if a product is not
sold under an umbrella brand beliefs must be constant in Ij.N o t e t h a t a
consumer may, in addition, condition her beliefs on the way she has received
the information, that is, whether the ﬁrm actively used external certiﬁcation
or, after the release of the product, its quality was detected due to random
quality checks by an outside party. We will analyze the relevance of this
distinction in Section 5.
3 Preliminary Results
3.1 Analysis in the Absence of Umbrella Branding
In the absence of umbrella branding, consumers cannot correlate beliefs be-
cause they do not know which products are produced by the same ﬁrm.
Because of assumptions 2 and 4, costly external certiﬁcation solves the asym-
metric information problem even in the absence of umbrella branding.
Remark 1 Suppose that the ﬁrm cannot use umbrella branding. In any sep-
arating equilibrium a high-quality product enters the market and is certiﬁed,
and a low-quality product does not enter.11
However, compared to the ﬁrst-best alternative (which is implemented
under full information), we observe that certiﬁcation generates social costs,
since resources are used in the certiﬁcation process (for simplicity, we can
assume that private costs are equal to social costs of certiﬁcation). As we will
show, umbrella branding provides a multi-product ﬁrm with an instrument
to transmit information to consumers without the need to invoke a costly
external certiﬁcation process for one or both of its products. We consider
11Note that there may exist pooling equilibria which give expected proﬁt 2(pθ H +(1−
p)θL − f). Hence the above separating is the unique Bayesian equilibrium if and only if
θH −f −c>2(pθ H +(1−p)θL−f). This is equivalent to 2(1−p)(θH −θL) >θ H −f +c.
8this equilibrium the benchmark against which to compare the equilibria with
umbrella branding.
3.2 Analysis in the Absence of Certiﬁcation
As another case, one may want to look at the signalling role of umbrella
branding in the absence of external certiﬁcation. This kind of environment
has been explored by the previous literature in models diﬀerent from ours.
Hence, let us analyze our model under the restriction that certiﬁcation is not
an option at stage 2.
Suppose that umbrella branding may signal product quality and is used
by a ﬁrm with two high-quality products but not by a ﬁrm of a diﬀerent type.
Then a ﬁrm with only one high-quality product cannot distinguish itself from
a ﬁrm with two low-quality products in the event that product quality is not
detected. We will now provide conditions under which entry with this kind
of (partial) pooling is proﬁtable and only a ﬁrm of type (θH,θ H) sells its
products under an umbrella brand.
In the candidate equilibrium, a ﬁrm with two high-quality products uses
umbrella branding and all other types enter but do not use umbrella branding
and sell each product under a separate brand (alternatively we could provide
conditions under which any ﬁrm of a type other than (θH,θ H) does not enter).
A ﬁrm belongs to this latter group with probability 2p(1 − p)+( 1− p)2 =
1−p2. Since the unconditional probability that a high-quality product is not
sold under an umbrella brand is p(1 − p), we have that p(1 − p)/(1 − p2)=
p/(1 + p) is the probability that a product is of high quality if it is sold
under a separate brand. Correspondingly, 1/(1 + p) is the probability that
a product is of low quality if it is sold under a separate brand. Along the
equilibrium path we thus have the following conditional beliefs: b(θi|u =
0,I i = {θH,θ L},I j)=1 /(1+p) for all Ij. In addition, two products that are
sold under an umbrella brand are believed to be of high quality unless there
is contradictory evidence, i.e., b(θi|u =1 ,I i = {θH,θ L},I j = {θH,θ L})=
b(θi|u =1 ,I i = {θH,θ L},I j = {θH}) = 1. To complete the belief system,
we specify out-of-equilibrium beliefs that support this equilibrium. Suppose
that when consumers observe low quality for a product within an umbrella
brand, they are pessimistic and believe that the quality of the other product
is also low, b(θi|u =1 ,I i = {θH,θ L},I j = {θL})=0 .
We now provide a condition for a ﬁrm with one high- and one low-quality
good to enter. If a ﬁrm enters with two unbranded products and the quali-
9ties of both products are not detected, its expected proﬁts per product are
p
1+p θH + 1
1+p θL provided that types (θH,θ L), (θL,θ H), and (θL,θ L)p o o l .
Therefore, a ﬁrm of type (θH,θ L)o r( θL,θ H) makes expected proﬁts of
δ(θH − f)+2( 1− δ)
 p
1+p θH + 1
1+p θL − f

+ δ (θL − f). A ﬁrm of type
(θL,θ L) obtains lower proﬁts as both of its products can be of low quality,
2δ(θL −f)+2(1−δ)
 p
1+p θH + 1
1+p θL − f

. Participation of a ﬁrm of type










This condition is satisﬁed if f is suﬃciently close to θL. Hence, if (1) holds,
a ﬁrm with two low-quality products enters, provided it does not use an
umbrella. This implies already that ﬁrms of type (θH,θ L)o r( θL,θ H)a l s o
enter. In addition, we have to show that in equilibrium, ﬁrms of type (θH,θ L),
(θL,θ H), or (θL,θ L) cannot make higher expected proﬁts by selling their
products under an umbrella brand. Consider ﬁrst a ﬁrm of type (θH,θ L)
or (θL,θ H). With probability 1 − δ, the low quality is not discovered by
consumers, in which case consumers believe that both products are of high
quality. Proﬁts in this case are 2(θH − f). With probability δ2, the quality
of both products is observed. Proﬁts in this case are θH + θL − 2f.W i t h
the remaining probability δ(1 − δ), consumers only obtain the information
that one of the products under the umbrella is of low quality. In this case we
have imposed out-of-equilibrium beliefs that the other product is also of low
quality. Proﬁts are then 2(θL − f). Expected deviation proﬁts are therefore
(1−δ)2(θH−f)+δ2 (θH+θL−2f)+δ(1−δ)2(θL−f)−k. These deviation
proﬁts have to be lower than proﬁts along the proposed equilibrium path.
Hence, a deviation is not proﬁtable if and only if
1 − δ
1+p
(2 − δ − pδ)(θ
H − θ
L) − k ≤ 0. (2)
is satisﬁed. Second, consider a ﬁrm of type (θL,θ L). Expected deviation
proﬁts are (1−δ)2 2(θH −f)+(1−(1−δ)2)2(θL −f)−k. These deviation
proﬁts have to be lower than proﬁts along the proposed equilibrium path.
Hence, a deviation is not proﬁtable if and only if
1 − δ
1+p






10This inequality is implied by (2). Finally, a ﬁrm of type (θH,θ H)m u s th a v e
an incentive to actually use the umbrella. The non-deviation constraint of
the ﬁrm of type (θH,θ H)i s
2(θ
H − f) − k ≥ 2δ(θ




















We can thus state the following remark.
Remark 2 Suppose that the ﬁrm cannot use external certiﬁcation and sup-
pose conditions (1), (2), and (3) are satisﬁed. Then there exist separating
equilibria in which a ﬁrm with two high-quality products uses umbrella brand-
ing as a signal of product quality, and all other ﬁrm types sell their products
under separate brands.
Note that conditions (2) and (3) have a similar structure and there exist
parameter constellations which satisfy both of them. Condition (1) is of
a diﬀerent form and is satisﬁed under some parameters from the set that
satisfy (2) and (3). In Appendix A.1, we show that the equilibrium satisﬁes
the intuitive criterion.
We also want to point out that there may be another type of equilib-
rium with umbrella branding, namely one in which types (θH,θ H), (θH,θ L),
and (θL,θ H) pool under the umbrella. In Appendix A.2, we analyze this
equilibrium and provide conditions for existence. In the following section
we introduce certiﬁcation; there we do not assume that any of the above
conditions is satisﬁed.
4 Branding as a Substitute to Certiﬁcation
In many real-world markets most consumers become informed about real-
ized quality through word-of-mouth. In such markets, it seems realistic to
assume that the vast majority of consumers is unaware of the original source
of information, namely if the ﬁrm externally certiﬁed its product or if the
product’s quality was revealed through, e.g., Consumer Reports in the U.S.
11or Stiftung Warentest in Germany. In this case, consumers cannot condition
their beliefs on the original source of information—the reverse hypothesis will
be analyzed in the next section, where consumers can condition their beliefs
on the source of information.
In the present section, we will ﬁrst analyze the parameter constellations
under which umbrella branding can be used as a signal of product quality
and thus fully substitutes for external certiﬁcation. We will then analyze the
situation in which the ﬁrm certiﬁes one product and uses umbrella branding
as a signal of high quality for the other product. Clearly, there is also an
equilibrium in which umbrella branding does not play any signalling role.
Since we are interested in equilibria with umbrella branding, we ignore this
possibility in the remainder.
4.1 Branding as a Full Substitute to Certiﬁcation
For the ﬁrm to use umbrella branding as a signal, suppose that consumers
believe that absent contradictory evidence, umbrella branding is associated
with high quality for both products (with probability 1). This means that
consumers hold beliefs b(θi|u =1 ,I i = {θH,θ L},I j = {θH,θ L})=1a n d
b(θi|u =1 ,I i = {θH,θ L},I j = {θH}) = 1. If consumers obtain the informa-
tion that one product is of low quality and the quality of the other product
remains unknown, they are assumed to form beliefs that the other product
is also of low quality, i.e., b(θi|u =1 ,I i = {θH,θ L},I j = {θL})=0 .
In the candidate equilibrium that we consider, a ﬁrm of type (θH,θ H)
decides to use umbrella branding and obtains proﬁts 2θH − 2f − k,w h e r e
k is the cost of using umbrella branding. Umbrella branding is superior to
external certiﬁcation as the ﬁrm can save on the external certiﬁcation costs
for each of its products.
By contrast, a ﬁrm of type (θH,θ L)o r( θL,θ H) does not use umbrella
branding in equilibrium. It certiﬁes its high-quality product and does not put
the other, low-quality product on the market. Its proﬁts are thus θH −c−f,
which is positive according to assumption 1. Thus a ﬁrm that is not able
to put two high-quality products on the market refrains from the use of
umbrella branding and externally certiﬁes its high-quality product. A ﬁrm
of type (θL,θ L) does not oﬀer any of its products on the market and therefore
makes zero proﬁts.
To support this equilibrium we have to show that there are no proﬁtable
deviations for any type. This will lead to parameter restrictions under which
12umbrella branding can fully substitute certiﬁcation for a ﬁrm of type (θH,θ H).
There are three potentially proﬁtable deviations, two for types (θH,θ L)a n d
(θL,θ H) and one for type (θL,θ L). We have to show that deviations are not
proﬁtable. The relevant deviation we have to consider is the use of umbrella
branding (by a ﬁrm with low-quality products, either with or without certi-
fying its high-quality product). Consider ﬁrst the use of umbrella branding





L − 2f)+δ(1 − δ)2(θ
L − f) − k.
These deviation proﬁts have to be less than θH − c − f. The corresponding
inequality can be rewritten as
δ (2 − δ)(f − θ
L) ≥ (1 − δ)
2(θ
H − f)+c − k. (4)
Since c<θ H − f by assumption, a suﬃcient condition is that δ (2 − δ)(f −
θL) ≥ [1 + (1 − δ)2](θH − f) − k.
Mimicking the (θH,θ H) type is successful unless low quality is detected.
Hence, with probability 1 − δ, the low-quality product is believed to be of
high quality and thus is sold at price θH. However, with probability δ,l o w
quality is detected. In this case, the ﬁrm does not recover its ﬁxed cost on
the low-quality product and makes a loss on this product. In addition, if
low quality but not high quality is detected (which happens with probability
δ(1 − δ)) the ﬁrm suﬀers from a negative reputation feed-back because also
its high-quality product is believed to be of low quality.
By certifying its high-quality product, the ﬁrm can avoid the negative
reputation feed-back eﬀect. We therefore turn to an alternative deviation of
aﬁ r mo ft y p e( θH,θ L), according to which it certiﬁes its high-quality product
and uses umbrella branding in an attempt to convince consumers that the
other product is of high quality. Suppose that, absent contradictory evidence,
consumers form such beliefs. Then with probability 1−δ, consumers do not
ﬁnd contradictory evidence and the ﬁrm makes proﬁts (θH−c−f)+(θH−f)−
k. However, with probability δ, the low-quality product is unmasked, and
proﬁts are (θH −c−f)+(θL−f)−k. The deviation is therefore unproﬁtable
if θH −c−f ≥ (1−δ)[(θH −c−f)+(θH −f)]+δ[(θH −c−f)+(θL−f)]−k,
which is equivalent to
δ(f − θ
L) ≥ (1 − δ)(θ
H − f) − k. (5)
We can also write this condition as δθ L+(1−δ)θH−f ≤ k. Remember that
an asymmetric information problem only exists if assumption 4 is satisﬁed,
13i.e., if δθ L +( 1− δ)θH − f>0. This shows that a necessary condition for
umbrella branding to work as a signal is that it is costly. Otherwise, a ﬁrm
with one high-quality and one low-quality product can certify its high-quality
product under an umbrella brand. Such a deviation would be proﬁtable
because, with probability 1 − δ, the low-quality product would falsely be
perceived to be of high quality, and there could be no negative reputation
feed-back on the high-quality product, because of its certiﬁcation.
The only possibly proﬁt-increasing deviation for a ﬁrm of type (θL,θ L)i s
to oﬀer both products on the market and to use umbrella branding. With
probability (1 − δ)2, the ﬁrm can masquerade as a high-quality producer
and make proﬁts 2(θH − f). Whenever at least one of the two products
is unmasked to be of low quality consumers believe that both products are
of low quality. This happens with probability 1 − (1 − δ)2 and proﬁts are
2(θL − f). Hence, deviation proﬁts
(1 − δ)
2 2(θ
H − f)+[ 1− (1 − δ)
2]2(θ
L − f) − k
have to be non-positive. This is equivalent to
2δ(2 − δ)(f − θ
L) ≥ 2(1− δ)
2(θ
H − f) − k
For k ∈ [0,2c], this inequality is implied by condition (4). We thus have
established the conditions under which umbrella branding can fully substitute
for external certiﬁcation.
Proposition 1 Suppose conditions (4) and (5) are satisﬁed. For k ∈ (0, 2c)
there is a PBE in which umbrella branding signals the high quality of both
products. Umbrella branding fully substitutes for external certiﬁcation.
To illustrate that these conditions are not mutually exclusive, ﬁrst note
that both conditions have the structure α(f − θL) ≥ γ + β (θH − f). In
the special case δ =1 /2, condition (4) becomes (3/4)(f −θL) ≥ (1/4)(θH −
f)+c − k and (5) becomes (1/2)(f − θL) ≥ (1/2)(θH − f) − k.T os a t i s f y
assumptions 1 to 4, parameters must satisfy θH − c − f>0, θH − f>
f −θL > 0, and θH −θL >c . As a particular example take θH =1 ,θL =0 .1,
c = k =0 .1, δ =0 .5a n df =0 .5.
4.2 Branding as a Partial Substitute to Certiﬁcation
Suppose now that consumers do not believe in the signalling role of umbrella
branding unless one of the two products is revealed to be of high quality,
14i.e., b(θi|u =1 ,I i = {θH,θ L},I j = {θH}) = 1, whereas b(θi|u =1 ,I i =
{θH,θ L},I j = {θH,θ L}) = 0. Can there be an equilibrium such that the ﬁrm
still uses umbrella branding as an attempt to signal high quality without
certifying any of its two products? The answer is negative. Suppose that
a ﬁrm with two high-quality products uses umbrella branding, but does not
certify and that other types of ﬁrms do not use umbrella branding. Then
with probability (1 − δ)2 the quality of neither product will be revealed to
consumers. In this case beliefs are not conﬁrmed (consumers experience a
positive surprise), so this cannot be part of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
There is a single equilibrium candidate under the above restrictions: The
ﬁrm with two high-quality products uses umbrella branding and certiﬁes
one of the two products. Hence, the ﬁrm partially substitutes for external
certiﬁcation with umbrella branding. The ﬁrm with a single high-quality
product—where the other product is of low quality—brings only this product
to the market and certiﬁes it. Low-quality products are not put on the
market.
This result can indeed be supported as an equilibrium outcome under
certain parameter constellations, as we will show next. Along the equilibrium
path, the ﬁrm of type (θ1,θ 2)=( θH,θ H) obtains proﬁts 2θH − c − k −
2f. Clearly, for k<c , this dominates the choice to externally certify both
products and to forego umbrella branding. Consider the deviation in which
neither of the two products is certiﬁed. Its expected proﬁts are then equal to




L) ≥ c. (6)
None of the other deviations are ever proﬁtable. Along the equilibrium path,
the ﬁrm of type (θi,θ j)=( θH,θ L) obtains proﬁts θH − c − f.C o n s i d e rn o w
the deviation to oﬀer both products on the market, to certify high quality,
and to use umbrella branding. Deviation proﬁts are θH −c−f +(1−δ)(θH −
f)+δ(θL − f) − k. A deviation is not proﬁtable if
δ(f − θ
L) ≥ (1 − δ)(θ
H − f) − k, (7)
which is the case if the detection probability δ is suﬃciently large. This
condition is equivalent to condition (5). Finally, consider the deviation in
which both products are oﬀered on the market, the high-quality product is
not certiﬁed, and umbrella branding is used. With probability δ(1 − δ), the
quality of the high-quality product (but not that of the low-quality product)
15is revealed to consumers, and therefore consumers believe that both products
are of high quality. With probability δ2, consumers become fully informed.
Otherwise, they believe that both products are of low quality. Expected
deviation proﬁts are therefore δ (1−δ)2(θH −f)+δ2 (θH +θL −2f)+(1−




L)+( f − θ
L) ≥ c − k. (8)
We thus have established the conditions under which umbrella branding can
partially substitute for external certiﬁcation.
Proposition 2 Suppose conditions (6), (7), and (8) are satisﬁed. Then for
k ∈ (0,c), there is a PBE in which umbrella branding, together with the
external certiﬁcation of one product, signals the high quality of the other
product. Umbrella branding partially substitutes for external certiﬁcation.
Let us argue that the conditions are mutually consistent. Two of the
necessary conditions for this type of equilibrium provide an upper bound on
the certiﬁcation cost (that is diﬀerent from the upper bound from assump-
tion 1, θH − c − f>0). In addition, given certiﬁcation of the high-quality
product, a ﬁrm of type (θH,θ L) must not have an incentive to use umbrella
branding, thus condition (7) must hold. To give an instance for consistency,
let us consider again the special case δ =1 /2. In this case, condition (6)
becomes (θH − θL)/2 ≥ c which is the weak form of assumption 2. Condi-
tion (8) becomes (θH − θL)/4+( f − θL) ≥ c − k and condition (7) becomes
(1/2)(f − θL) ≥ (1/2)(θH − f) − k. To satisfy assumptions 1, 3, and 4,
parameters must satisfy θH − c − f>0a n dθH − f>f− θL > 0. The set
of parameters that satisfy all these inequalities is non-empty. A particular
example is the parameter constellation reported in the previous subsection
with the only diﬀerence that k must be smaller than c,e . g . ,k =0 .075, so
that there is a strict gain from using umbrella branding as a partial substitute
to external certiﬁcation.
Our ﬁnal point is that we can make the case in favor of full substitution
and against partial substitution based on a priori restrictions on admissible
beliefs and the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987). Suppose that um-
brella branding is a viable signalling strategy, i.e., (4) is satisﬁed. Let us
now restrict beliefs under umbrella branding to have the following property
(PC): Absent contradictory evidence, consumers believe that product quality
is perfectly correlated when products are sold under an umbrella brand. This
16implies that consumers must hold out-of-equilibrium beliefs that a product
of unknown quality must be of low quality if the other product under the um-
brella is detected to be of low quality. Consider now equilibrium beliefs under
partial substitution. Note that umbrella branding without certiﬁcation is a
zero probability event. This implies that the situation in which a consumer
observes umbrella branding but none of the two qualities is observed occurs
only oﬀ the equilibrium path. As we have seen in the previous subsection,
the use of umbrella branding without certiﬁcation is equilibrium-dominated
for all ﬁrms other than type (θH,θ H), for all possible beliefs (under the re-
striction that property PC is satisﬁed). However, there exist beliefs that
make a deviation to umbrella branding without certiﬁcation proﬁtable for
type (θH,θ H). Therefore, following the forward induction argument inher-
ent in the intuitive criterion, consumers should believe that such a deviation
must come from type (θH,θ H). This destabilizes the equilibrium with partial
substitution.
5 Conditioning of Beliefs
So far, we have implicitly assumed that consumers do not know the source
of their information, and thus cannot condition beliefs on this source. In
this section we assume that consumers learn whether the product informa-
tion they receive is due to external certiﬁcation (as a deliberate decision of
the ﬁrm) or due to detection. Clearly, in our setup this is only relevant
for a product whose high quality has been revealed. The belief function
b then includes two additional arguments, namely whether product 1 has
been externally certiﬁed and whether product 2 has been externally certi-
ﬁed. Denote these decisions by xi ∈{ 0,1},w h e r exi = 1 stands for the
certiﬁcation of product i. In a slight abuse of notation, we write beliefs as
b(θi|u,x1,x 2,I 1,I 2).
Why should the conditioning matter? A ﬁrm that uses umbrella brand-
ing and has one high- and one low-quality product may want to certify its
high-quality product to avoid a reputation feed-back eﬀect (consumers who
detect the low-quality product, but not the high-quality product, could be-
lieve that also the undetected product is of low-quality). Note that a ﬁrm
with two high-quality products does not share this concern and consequently
does not certify one of its products. This argument provides a rationale for
consumers to condition beliefs on the source of information. We will now
17show that umbrella branding can then be supported as a signal for a larger
set of parameters under a particular belief system.
Take the following system of beliefs: If a separate brand is observed,
then, in case of doubt, consumers believe products to be of low quality.
If an umbrella brand is observed, beliefs have the following property: if
consumers know that a product is of high quality (because of detection or
external certiﬁcation), we must have b(θ1|u =1 ,x 1,x 2,I 1 = {θH},I 2)=1
for xi ∈{ 0,1}. If consumers do not have information on product 1 and if
product 2 was not certiﬁed, they believe that product 1 must be of high
quality, i.e., b(θ1|u =1 ,x 1 =0 ,x 2 =0 ,I 1 = {θL,θ H},I 2 = {θL,θ H})=1 .
This does not change if the other product is detected to be of high quality,
b(θ1|u =1 ,x 1 =0 ,x 2 =0 ,I 1 = {θL,θ H},I 2 = {θH})=1 . 12 However, if,
instead, product 2 was certiﬁed, they believe that product 1 must be of low
quality, i.e., b(θ1|u =1 ,x 1 =0 ,x 2 =1 ,I 1 = {θL,θ H},I 2 = {θH}) = 0; and
correspondingly for product 2. Then under which parameter conditions can
the umbrella be supported as a signal of product quality?
As in Section 4.1, the relevant deviations to consider are those in which
aﬁ r mo ft y p e( θH,θ L) uses umbrella branding on its own or in combination
with the external certiﬁcation of its high-quality product and in which a
ﬁrm of type (θL,θ L) uses umbrella branding on its own. Equilibrium and
deviation proﬁts are the same as the ones reported in Section 4.1, with only
one exception. This is the above described case in which a ﬁrm of type
(θH,θ L) uses umbrella branding in combination with external certiﬁcation.
Here deviation proﬁts are
(θ
H − c − f)+( θ
L − f) − k,
which is strictly less than the deviation proﬁts reported in Section 4.1 and,
more importantly, which is necessarily strictly less than the proﬁts along the
postulated equilibrium path, θH−c−f. The inequality even holds if umbrella
branding is not costly. This implies that the set of parameters under which
umbrella branding can serve as a signal is described by condition (4).
Proposition 3 Suppose that consumers can condition their beliefs on whether
their information is due to external certiﬁcation or detection and that con-
dition (4) is satisﬁed. For k ∈ (0,2c) there is a PBE in which umbrella
12As in the previous section, the detection of low quality of the other product is inter-
preted as bad news about the product under consideration, i.e., b(θ1|u =1 ,x 1 =0 ,x 2 =
0,I 1 = {θL,θ H},I 2 = {θL})=0 .
18branding signals the high quality of both products. Umbrella branding fully
substitutes for external certiﬁcation.
The intuition for this result is that, in the presence of certiﬁcation, con-
sumers negatively correlate beliefs about product quality. Namely, a product
of unknown quality is believed to be of low quality if it is sold together with
a certiﬁed high-quality product under an umbrella brand. Consumers here
“punish” certiﬁcation of one of the products under umbrella branding, which
makes umbrella branding, together with certiﬁcation, a strategy that cannot
be proﬁt-maximizing.
In this setting it is possible that, even if umbrella branding is costless or
carries a beneﬁt, k<0 (e.g., because of economies-of-scope in advertising),
umbrella branding can be supported as a signal of product quality. Condition
(4) is met if k ≥ c +( 1− δ)2 (θH − f) − δ(2 − δ)(f − θL). Take the same
parameter constellation as in section 4.1 without ﬁxing k: θH =1 ,θL =0 .1,
c =0 .1, δ =0 .5a n df =0 .5. In this example, condition (4) becomes k ≥
−0.075. We have thus constructed a one-period model in which certiﬁcation
perfectly reveals product quality and still there is an information role for
umbrella branding, even if it is not costly to use.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In many markets, ﬁrms have to choose between implicit quality promises
and external or third-party certiﬁcation. External certiﬁcation can be seen
as beyond doubt if it comes from a semi-public institution that works in
the public interest, or if it comes from a private institution that does not
put its reputation at stake. Implicit quality promises by the ﬁrm—this may
be dubbed self-certiﬁcation—appear more problematic, since they may lack
credibility. In this paper we have shown that umbrella branding, interpreted
as self-certiﬁcation, can be a cost-eﬃcient way to signal product quality. It
can fully or partially substitute for external certiﬁcation.
In a single-period model with positive detection probabilities for high and
low quality, umbrella branding can fully substitute for external certiﬁcation,
provided that its use is costly. A ﬁrm may have to use umbrella branding,
together with certiﬁcation of one of its products, when consumers are skepti-
cal about umbrella brands that do not include certiﬁed products. Here, the
umbrella is used to convince consumers that information which comes from
19the certiﬁcation of one of its products also shows that the non-certiﬁed prod-
uct is of high quality. This is sustained as an equilibrium outcome because
imitating is detected with some (suﬃciently large) probability, and umbrella
branding is costly. Note that since one of the products is certiﬁed, there is
no reputation feed-back eﬀect.
However, if consumers condition their beliefs on the source of informa-
tion, certiﬁcation of a product under an umbrella may be interpreted as an
indication of the low quality of the other product. This improves the sig-
nalling potential of umbrella branding and makes the signalling argument
compatible with umbrella branding bringing ﬁxed beneﬁts in the presence of
external certiﬁcation.
In our formal analysis, we have interpreted c as the cost of external certi-
ﬁcation. As we have pointed out in the main text, we can alternatively inter-
pret c as the cost of extended warranties for high-quality producers (which
may involve a social cost because of a moral hazard problem on the consumer
side) under the assumption that such extended warranties are prohibitively
costly for low-quality producers to apply for. Firms with a broad product
portfolio may be able to avoid these costs c with the help of umbrella brand-
ing. Interestingly, we observe that in the past, Japanese, and, more recently,
South Korean producers entered European and the U.S. markets with ex-
tended warranties for cars and household appliances (and, initially, with a
small product range), at the time when established manufacturers used um-
brella branding but did not oﬀer such extended warranties. Although our
model does not capture dynamic aspects which are likely to be of relevance
in the present example (such as, e.g., diﬀerent degrees of previously accumu-
lated reputation), our results are in line with the observation that producers
with abilities in a small product range have to use instruments other than
umbrella branding to convince consumers of high quality, whereas producers
with broad abilities may be able to avoid the use of these costly alternatives.
A Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium Reﬁnement
















20Recall that we have assumed the following out-of-equilibrium beliefs: when
consumers observe that one product is of low quality, they believe that the
other product is of high quality with probability 0, i.e., b(θi|u =1 ,I i =
{θH,θ L},I j = {θL}) = 0. For the equilibrium to satisfy the intuitive criterion
by Cho and Kreps (1987), we have to show that there exist out-of-equilibrium
beliefs that make a deviation to umbrella branding by (θL,θ L)p r o ﬁ t a b l e .
Then the above-mentioned out-of-equilibrium beliefs cannot be ruled out by
the intuitive criterion.
Consider the following out-of-equilibrium beliefs: consumers believe that
an undetected product under the umbrella brand is of high quality with
probability 1 even if the other product is known to be of low quality, b(θi|u =
1,I i = {θH,θ L},I j = {θL}) = 1. Under these alternative out-of-equilibrium
beliefs, a ﬁrm of type (θL,θ L) makes proﬁts
δ
2 2θ




H) − 2f − k
=2 δθ
L +2( 1− δ)θ
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This inequality is identical to condition (3). Hence, there always exist out-
of-equilibrium beliefs that justify type (θL,θ L)’s deviation to use umbrella
branding and we cannot exclude this type from the set of types on which
consumers put positive probability in their beliefs given that u = 1. The equi-
librium therefore survives the intuitive criterion by Cho and Kreps (1987).
A.2 Additional Equilibria
In this section, we address the question whether there is an equilibrium where
ﬁrms of types (θH,θ H), (θH,θ L), and (θL,θ H) pool by all using an umbrella
brand, with the according beliefs.
First, if the quality of none of the two products is detected, a consumer
expects the quality of a product to be high with probability
p2 + p(1 − p)





21which is greater than p for all p<1. Second, if high quality is detected
for one of the two products, the consumer expects the quality of the other
product to be high with probability
p2
p2 + p(1 − p)
= p.
Hence, the expected quality for the other product increases if one product is
detected to have low quality. Third, if low quality is detected for one of the
two products, the consumer expects the quality of the other product to be
high with probability 1. As a consequence, the expected deviation proﬁts of
aﬁ r mo ft y p e( θL,θ L) selling under an umbrella brand would be
δ
2 2θ

















− k − 2f.
In equilibrium, this expression must be negative. In addition, a ﬁrm of type
(θH,θ L) must make positive expected proﬁts, which leads to a condition of
the form λ1(θH − f) − k<λ 2(f − θL)f o rs o m en u m b e r sλ1, λ2 that depend
on the other parameters of the model.
The candidate equilibrium fails to be an equilibrium if the above expected

















H − f) − k.
In general, this inequality may or may not be satisﬁed.
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